In 2002, the California Voting Rights Act, S.B. 976, was signed into law. (Elec. Code §§ 14027-14032.) The Act makes fundamental changes to minority voting rights law in California. As of January 1, 2003, the California Voting Rights Act (“CVRA”) alters established paradigms of proof and defenses under the federal Voting Rights Act, thus making it easier for plaintiffs in California to challenge allegedly discriminatory voting practices. The potential consequences of this legislation are significant: it could force a city or special district to abandon an electoral system that may be perfectly legal under

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1 As noted in a celebratory press statement by the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) following the passage of S.B. 976, which along with the ACLU and voting rights attorney Joaquin Avila, was a primary supporter of the CVRA, the “[b]ill makes it easier for California minorities to challenge ‘at-large’ elections.”
federal law, in the process exposing the jurisdiction to the possibility of paying very high awards of attorneys fees to plaintiffs.²

California’s cities, counties, and special districts have had almost four decades of experience in complying with the federal Voting Rights Act (“federal VRA”), especially Section 2, the landmark legislation outlawing both intentional discrimination in voting practices and those practices that have unintentional but discriminatory effects when viewed in the totality of the circumstances. (Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, Stat. 437 (1965), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973ff-6 (1994).) Indeed, California has adopted compliance with Section 2 as one of its statutory redistricting criteria for cities, counties, and special districts. (See, e.g., Elec. Code §§ 21601 [general law cities], 21620 [charter cities], & 22000 [special districts].) After decades of litigation under the federal VRA, the courts have provided a wealth of guidance for cities and special districts in identifying practices that may have discriminatory effects. Most notable in California is the prevalence of the “at-large” electoral system (see description below). Jurisdictions have learned to consider changing to a district-based electoral system when they have minority group residents who are sufficiently numerous and geographically concentrated to form a majority in a single-member district, especially when that minority group, despite running candidates for election, consistently fails to elect.

But now the voting rights legal environment with which cities and special districts have grown familiar has changed significantly. Here are some of the highlights.

CVRA Highlights.

- Focus of the CVRA: “At-large” and “From-district” Elections.

If your city or special district elects its governing board members “by-district,” (i.e., only by the voters of the district, sometimes called “division” or “area,” in which the candidate resides), you can stop reading now. The CVRA does not apply to a by-district electoral system. However, if you have an “at-large” or “from-district” system, read on!

The CVRA applies only to at-large and from-district electoral systems, or combination systems. (Elec. Code §§ 14026(a), 14027.) At-large systems are those in which each member of the governing board is elected by all the voters in the jurisdiction. Most

² In federal voting rights cases, the litigation bill can run to hundreds of thousands of dollars even for a small jurisdiction of a few thousand people. See Florence Adams, Latinos and Local Representation: Changing Realities, Emerging Theories 73 (Garland 2000) (noting that in the City of Dinuba, California, the costs of federal voting rights litigation added up to nearly $60 per person, more than the annual cost of Dinuba’s Fire Department). In a voting rights case filed against the City of Santa Paula in 2000 and recently settled, the City reportedly spent $700,000 for attorneys fees. See T.J. Sullivan, “Santa Paula Quiet on Measure D,” Ventura County Star B-01 (Oct. 20, 2002).
jurisdictions in California, especially smaller jurisdictions, have at-large electoral systems. “From-district” elections differ from at-large systems only in that they require each member of the governing board to live within a particular district. Election, however, is still by all the voters in the jurisdiction, rather than being limited to the voters within a district. There are also combination systems in which, for example, a primary election may be conducted “by-district”, but the general election is conducted “from” those same districts, e.g., the top two vote winners in the primary in each district run for election “at-large” in the general election.

Each of these variations is equally vulnerable to challenge if the minority plaintiffs can show that racially-polarized voting undercuts their ability to elect or influence the election of minority-preferred candidates. Features that might cause plaintiffs to scrutinize a city or special district as a potential target for a CVRA challenge include a history of electoral losses by minority candidates or a history of unresolved issues disproportionately affecting the minority community (e.g., affordable housing, street and sidewalk maintenance, juvenile crime, etc.), coupled with a significant proportion of the population that are ethnic or racial minorities.

- **Protection For Minority Electoral “Influence.”**

The federal VRA prohibits the use of electoral systems that abridge the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice. Thus, if the minority plaintiffs would have still been unable to elect their chosen candidates in the absence of the challenged at-large system, the plaintiff would have very little chance of stating a federal claim (see below). Not so under the CVRA. The CVRA invalidates not only at-large elections that prevent minority voters from electing their chosen candidates, but also those that impair the ability of minority voters to influence elections.

Indeed, only two federal courts have ever held\(^3\) that the federal VRA requires, rather than merely permits, the creation of influence districts in the absence of a showing of intentional discrimination, and both are of questionable precedential value. See *Armour v. Ohio*, 895 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1990); *East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson*, 691 F.Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988). One of the opinions, *Armour v. Ohio*, was subsequently vacated when rehearing en banc was granted, 925 F.2d 987 (6th Cir. 1991). On remand the district court implicitly sanctioned such claims again, 775 F.Supp. 1044, 1059 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 1991),\(^4\) but later opinions from the Sixth Circuit have not treated *Armour* as binding on this issue, and have, in fact, expressly rejected influence suits. See *Cousin v. Sundquist*, 145 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 1998) (“We do not feel that an ‘influence’ claim is permitted under the Voting Rights Act.”); *Parker v. Ohio*, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8745, *11 (S.D. Ohio). The holding of the second case, *East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership*, was effectively undermined when the court subsequently amended the finding that necessitated the influence claim: that the minority community was too widely dispersed in the jurisdiction to constitute a majority in a single-member district. See *East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership & Dev. v. Parish of Jefferson*, 926 F.2d 487, 491 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting the amended finding that the minority group could indeed constitute a majority in a single-member district).

Given the reluctance of federal courts to enter the political thicket of influence suits, by opening the door to such claims the CVRA greatly expands protection for minority voting rights and, consequently, the potential for liability of cities and special districts.

The next question, of course, is obvious: what constitutes “influence”? The answer, unfortunately, is not so obvious. The CVRA does not define “influence” and there is very little federal precedent on which to rely for guidance. As the federal district court for Rhode Island put it in *Metts v. Almond*:

“Ability to influence” itself, is a nebulous term that defies precise definition. If it means only the potential to alter the outcome of an election, it provides no standard at all because a single voter can be said to have that ability. On the other hand, if it means something more, there does not appear to be any workable definition of how much more is required and/or any meaningful way to determine whether the requirement has been satisfied.

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\(^3\) Several other courts have assumed as much, without so deciding, instead ruling on other grounds. See, e.g., *Voinovich*, 507 U.S. at 154; *West v. Clinton*, 786 F.Supp. 803, 806 (W.D. Ark. 1992).

\(^4\) The district court in *Armour* purported to avoid the question of influence claims. See 775 F.Supp. at 1059 n.19 (“We need not reach the question of whether [an influence claim] may be viable under the Voting Rights Act because we find that the plaintiffs have met their burden of demonstrating an ability to elect a candidate of their choice.”). But as Judge Batchelder noted in dissent, the Court only avoided the issue by first holding that the plaintiffs need not constitute a majority in the reconfigured district. 775 F.Supp. at 1079 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). In so ruling, “the majority opinion effectively h[eld] that there is a cause of action under Section 2 when political boundaries are drawn so that they fail to maximize a minority group’s ability to influence the outcome of elections.” *Id.*
Nevertheless, defining “influence” is the task that a California court may soon face. The definition may well be case-specific to the demographic and political circumstances in each defendant jurisdiction, leaving local jurisdictions without clear guidelines.

- **Streamlined Proof for Plaintiffs.**

Federal voting rights cases under Section 2 require that a successful plaintiff show that (1) the minority group be sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority of the eligible voters in a single-member district, (2) there is racially-polarized voting, and (3) there is white bloc voting sufficient usually to prevent minority voters from electing candidates of their choice. *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). If (and only if) all three of these “preconditions” are proven, the court then proceeds to consider whether, under the “totality of circumstances” the votes of minority voters are diluted. (42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) [prescribing the totality of the circumstances standard].)

The CVRA, by contrast, purports to prescribe an extremely light burden on the plaintiff to establish a violation. Under the CVRA, plaintiffs apparently can prove a violation based solely on evidence of racially-polarized voting. (Elec. Code §§ 14027 & 14028(e).) Racially-polarized voting is defined as “voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.), in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and the electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate.” (Elec. Code § 14026(e).) See *Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria*, 160 F.3d 543, 552 (9th Cir. 1998) (adopting relatively lenient “separate electorates” test for determining whether a candidate was a minority-preferred candidate who was defeated by white bloc voting), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999).

The CVRA appears to eliminate the first precondition that plaintiffs must prove at the liability stage in federal litigation, that is, that the minority group is sufficiently large and geographically compact to form a majority in a single member district. (Elec. Code § 14028(c).) Assuming that racially-polarized voting can be proven, the CVRA defers inquiry into the size and geographical compactness of the minority group and the impact of those factors on the minority voters’ ability to elect or ability to influence elections, to the remedial phase of the litigation. (See discussion below.)

The CVRA also eliminates the requirement that plaintiffs prove discrimination under the totality of the circumstances test. (Elec. Code § 14028(e).) This departure from the federal standards may prove to be the most significant. Some federal courts have been very lenient in finding racially-polarized voting. They could afford to be so lenient,
because, under federal law, establishing racially-polarized voting is not sufficient to prove a violation. The other *Thornburg v. Gingles* preconditions must be established and a violation must be proven in the “totality of the circumstances” phase of the lawsuit. The totality analysis then permits a federal judge to take into account such matters as the degree of the racially-polarized voting and perhaps find that it was not severe enough to warrant judicial intervention into the electoral processes of a city.

The CVRA does not require any comparable “totality of the circumstances” analyses as part of the plaintiff’s proof. Under what would seem to be a draconian application of the CVRA, plaintiffs could argue that a jurisdiction is subject to liability if 51% of minority voters vote one way, 51% of non-minority voters vote the other way, and the minority-preferred candidate loses. Whether a court would sanction such an extreme application of the CVRA, without the subsequent safety valve of the totality analysis, cannot be known at this time. Another plausible reading of the CVRA is that the Legislature meant to ease the burden on plaintiffs but still permit the totality analysis to come in by way of defense. (Elec. Code § 14028(e) [stating that many of the traditional totality factors are “probative,” but not necessary to establish a violation].)

Despite the fact that Section 14028(a) provides that a violation is established if racially-polarized voting is shown, the legislation does identify at least one other factor that bears on the question of liability. Specifically the CVRA provides that the extent to which candidates who are members of a protected class and who are preferred by voters of the protected class have been elected to the governing body of a jurisdiction is “one circumstance that may be considered in determining a violation.” (Elec. Code § 14028(b) [emphasis added].) Thus phrased, the relevance of such evidence would not appear to be limited to the remedial stage, but would affect the question of liability as well. Moreover, the phraseology suggests that other, unspecified circumstances may be considered on the question of liability as well. Under the federal scheme, minority plaintiffs whose preferred candidates have a winning record would find it difficult, if not impossible, to establish a violation of the federal VRA. Presumably this would be the result under the CVRA, but the new law is not explicit on that point. Also, the CVRA specifies that the successful candidate must also be a member of the minority group in order to be taken into consideration as “one circumstance” that may be considered at the liability phase of the litigation. The CVRA is silent on whether the election of non-minority persons who are proven to be the preferred candidates of minority voters can also be considered. Plaintiffs may well argue that such successful minority-preferred candidates do not count.

- **New Remedies.**

The most likely remedy in a successful CVRA action would be to order cities and special districts with at-large, from-district, or mixed electoral systems to change to by-district systems in which a minority group will be empowered either to elect its preferred candidates, or influence the election outcome. But judicial remedies under the Act may
not be limited to the imposition of a by-district system. In cases where the minority group may be too small to form a majority in a single member district (i.e., a district from which one member of the governing board is elected), the CVRA mandates that a court impose remedies “appropriate” to the violation. Indeed, the advocates of limited or cumulative voting systems may see the CVRA as an opportunity to attempt to impose such experimental remedies in California.

In a limited voting system, voters either cast fewer votes than the number of seats, or political parties nominate fewer candidates than there are seats. Theoretically, the greater the difference between the number of seats and the number of votes, the greater the opportunities for minorities to elect their chosen candidates. Versions of limited voting are used in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia (PA), Hartford (CT) and many smaller jurisdictions.

In a cumulative voting system, voters cast as many votes as there are seats. But unlike winner-take-all systems, voters are not limited to giving only one vote to a candidate. Instead voters can cast some or all of their votes for one or more candidates. Chilton County (AL), Alamogordo (NM), and Peoria (IL) all use a version of cumulative voting, as do a number of smaller jurisdictions. The State of Illinois used cumulative voting for state legislative elections from 1870 to 1980.

- **No-Risk Litigation For Plaintiffs.**

The CVRA mandates the award of costs, attorneys fees, and expert expenses to prevailing plaintiffs. (Elec. Code § 14030.) Prevailing defendants, however, are not treated so kindly. The CVRA denies not only attorneys fees but also the costs of litigation to prevailing defendants, unless the court finds a suit to be “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation,” an extremely high standard. (*Id.*)

Furthermore, California law interprets “prevailing party” more broadly than does the analogous federal law governing attorneys fees awards for actions brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The United States Supreme Court has, as a matter of statutory interpretation, recently rejected the “catalyst” theory of prevailing parties. *Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.*, 532 U.S. 598, 603-05 (2001). The catalyst theory, which the California Supreme Court has previously approved, permits recovery of attorneys fees if there is any “causal connection” between the plaintiffs’ lawsuit and a change in behavior by the defendant. *Maria P. v. Riles*, 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1291 (1987). The *Maria P.* court continued:

““The appropriate benchmarks in determining which party prevailed are (a) the situation immediately prior to the commencement of suit, and (b) the situation today, and the role, if any, played by the litigation in effecting any changes between the two.”” . . . An award of attorney fees under section 1021.5 is
appropriate when a plaintiff’s lawsuit “was a catalyst motivating defendants to provide the primary relief sought,” or when plaintiff vindicates an important right “by activating defendants to modify their behavior.”

Id. at 1291-92 (quoting Folsom v. Butte County Assn. of Governments, 32 Cal.3d 668, 685 n.31 (1982); Westside Community for Independent Living, Inc. v. Obledo, 33 Cal.3d 348, 353 (1983)) (internal citations omitted).

Federal law, by contrast, requires some “change [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.” Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 (quoting Texas State Teachers Assn. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1987)). In other words, it is not enough under federal law that the defendant changed its conduct voluntarily—there must be some legally compelled impediment to the defendant falling back into the old ways, like a judgment or a settlement.

The California Supreme Court has traditionally treated federal precedent interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as persuasive authority, but it has also held that such federal precedent is not binding with regards to interpretation of state attorneys fee law. See Serrano v. Unruh, 32 Cal.3d 621, 639 n.29 (1982). Thus, the Buckhannon holding will not inevitably lead California to reject the catalyst theory in CVRA litigation as well.

Charter Cities.

Charter cities should not be complacent in a belief that they are immune from successful challenge under the new CVRA. The CVRA, after all, purports to apply to “cities” without making any explicit distinction between general law or charter cities. (Elec. Code § 14026(c).) It is true that a charter can provide for a form of government or electoral process for a city that is different from the general law. A charter city, however, remains subject to the California Constitution and would be prohibited from adopting or maintaining a discriminatory electoral system or electoral practices that violate the equal protection clause or the right to vote. See Canaan v. Abdelnour, 40 Cal.3d 703 (1985), overruled on other grounds by Edelstein v. City & County of San Francisco, 29 Cal.4th 164, 183 (2002); Rees v. Layton, 6 Cal.App.3d 815 (1970). Furthermore, California courts have recognized that state statutes can override city charters if they are narrowly-tailored to address an issue of statewide concern, even in the core areas of charter city control like election administration. Edelstein, 29 Cal.4th at 172-174; Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal.4th 389, 398-400 (1992). The CVRA expressly provides that it is intended to implement the guarantees of Section 7 of Article I (Equal Protection) and Section 2 of Article II (Right to Vote) of the California Constitution, which are themselves regarded as matters of statewide concern. See Cawdrey v. City of Redondo Beach, 15 Cal.App.4th 1212, 1226 (1993).
It is always possible that the California Supreme Court would decide that, even if preserving the right to vote is a matter of statewide concern, the CVRA sweeps too broadly and cuts too deeply into municipal affairs in violation of the principle of home rule. As the Supreme Court has noted, “[T]he sweep of the state’s protective measures may be no broader than its interest.” *Johnson*, 4 Cal.4th at 400. *Cf. Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2000) (when Congress seeks to enforce constitutional protections with legislation, the statutory scheme must be congruent and proportional to the injury to be prevented or remedied); *City of Boerne v. Flores*, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). For example, charter cities could argue that, assuming eradicating the adverse effects of racially-polarized voting in at-large electoral systems is a matter of statewide concern, the CVRA is not narrowly-tailored because the federal VRA presents a scheme more carefully-crafted to weed out those at-large systems in which, under the totality of circumstances, minority voting rights are abridged, and leave in place those at-large systems in which a minority candidate may have simply lost an election.

**Vote of the People.**

The sole fact that the voters of a city or special district have enacted an at-large electoral system by ballot measure, or rejected a by-district electoral system by ballot measure, will not protect a jurisdiction. Indeed, the latter may increase the risk to the jurisdiction by serving as persuasive proof of a violation of the CVRA if the by-district system was rejected in an election characterized by a racially-polarized vote.

**No Minority Candidates.**

The fact that no members of the minority group have ever run for membership on the legislative body will not insulate a jurisdiction from CVRA challenge. The CVRA expressly provides that a violation can be shown if racially-polarized voting occurs in elections incorporating other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members of a protected class, such as ballot measures. (Elec. Code §§ 14028(a) & (b).) Some particularly obvious examples from the last decade might include Proposition 187 (denying state services to undocumented immigrants), Proposition 209 (preventing state agencies from adopting affirmative action programs), and Proposition 227 (barring the use of bilingual education in California public schools). See *Cano v. Davis*, 211 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1241 n.37 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (assuming these initiatives may be used to demonstrate racially-polarized voting). But other local measures may also serve the same purpose.

**CONCLUSION**

California’s cities and special districts are entering a new and uncertain era in voting rights law. Much about the CVRA is unclear and federal precedent on key issues appears to have been legislatively overruled. It may require years of litigation to sort it all out. It
is impossible to know now whether California courts will uphold the constitutionality of the CVRA, how they will interpret the new law, or what defenses will be available. Perhaps the “totality of the circumstances” test will be reinvigorated by way of defense. In the meantime, there is a safe harbor under the CVRA (though still not necessarily under the federal Voting Rights Act): a by-district electoral system.

Jurisdictions with a history of electoral losses by candidates who are members of a minority group should consider analyzing those elections for racially-polarized voting. If polarized voting is detected, these jurisdictions may want to consider whether a change to a by-district electoral system is warranted. Demands by minority group representatives for a change to by-district elections must be taken seriously, even if the minority group is not numerous enough to form a majority in a new single member district. Changing voluntarily permits the elected representatives and the voters, rather than adverse plaintiffs or a court, to control the districting process and the considerations that will guide the districting. Once the single member districts are in place, the city or special district is in the CVRA safe harbor, even if the districts are not exactly those that plaintiffs would have preferred.